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Abstract In recent years several commentators have identified a ‘procedural 
turn’ by the European Court of Human Rights whereby it places increased 
emphasis on the presence or absence and/or quality of legislative and judicial 
deliberations at domestic level when assessing the proportionality of allegedly 
rights-infringing measures.  One area where the procedural turn has been 
particularly apparent is in relation to cases involving blanket bans on activities 
protected by the European Convention.  On most accounts this move to 
‘process-based review’ is causally linked to the principle of subsidiarity. In 
this article it is argued that whilst the shift to process-based review may 
generally have sound justifications in terms of the subsidiary role of the 
European Court as compared to States parties to the Convention, there are 
nevertheless several ironic downsides to this approach in the case of blanket 
bans, in terms of the certainty and predictability of the Court’s case law. 
Furthermore, and more critically, there may be serious consequences in terms 
of the rights protection afforded to vulnerable minorities within states who 
may be at the receiving end of such legislative blanket bans. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years many commentators have detected a ‘procedural turn’ in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court or the ECtHR).1 According to this 
thesis the Court, when undertaking its analysis of the proportionality of claimed 
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violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or Convention), has 
started to place more emphasis on the quality of legislative deliberations that 
precipitated alleged breaches of rights at national level, than on the substantive merits 
of the relevant case. On most accounts this development, which is referred to (inter 
alia) as a ‘procedural turn’, ‘procedural review’ or ‘process-based review’,2 is 
causally linked to the doctrine of subsidiarity – the view that national authorities are 
better placed to strike such balances, and that within the Convention system the 
primary protectors of human rights are States parties.3  
Notwithstanding an abundance of scholarship on the procedural turn, there 
remains one important aspect on which there has been, to date, relatively little focus: 
the way that it has been applied in cases challenging the proportionality of wide-
ranging blanket bans on types of conduct which, on the face of it, should be afforded 
protection under the ECHR.  
At first glance inflexible laws which infringe human rights and take little or no 
account of individual circumstances might seem to struggle to pass muster on human 
rights proportionality grounds. Yet, on closer inspection, as explained below, such 
blanket bans have often been found not to violate human rights where the domestic 
legislative processes by which they were introduced have been held by the Court to be 
comprehensive and thorough. As such these blanket bans have been one of the main 
vehicles by which the Court has been able to undertake its ‘procedural turn’. 
It is our contention that the application of process-based review in this area 
has not only produced some ironic consequences, but also creates a number of 
potentially serious adjudicatory problems for the ECtHR that cut to the quick of its 
role as the primary human rights court in contemporary Europe. In particular, we 
suggest, there has been an injection of a large dose of uncertainty and inconsistency 
into the Court’s adjudication. Even more critically, however, we argue that the 
procedural turn in blanket ban cases may have serious consequences for the protection 
of the rights of those from some of Europe’s most vulnerable minorities whose voices 
may struggle to be heard in the democratic forums of States parties, no matter how 
rigorous those institutions’ processes are. 
The primary focus of this article is the under-explored nexus between process-
based review, subsidiarity, and blanket bans, and it adopts the following structure. 
Part II introduces the concept of blanket bans and some of the key ECtHR cases that 
illustrate the procedural turn. Part III considers the principle of subsidiarity and the 
underlying reasons and justifications for the procedural turn. Part IV explores some of 
the ironic and problematic consequences of this move in relation to blanket bans. 
Finally Part V concludes that whilst the use of process-based review might be 
inevitable and even useful in the current geo-legal environment in which the Court 
operates it should, nonetheless, be approached with a degree of caution.  
 
II. BLANKET BANS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE PROCEDURAL TURN 
 
Philosophers from Aristotle to Hart have recognized that all systems of law have to 
negotiate a fundamental tension between, on the one hand, legal certainty (so that 
people know where they stand) and, on the other, flexibility (so that individual 
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circumstances can be taken into account and fair outcomes reached).4 Where human 
rights are concerned this tension is particularly acute. Since human rights are often 
invoked in order to protect the individual against the application of laws backed by 
majorities in democratic societies, there is a presumption in human rights adjudication 
towards a fact-sensitive system that takes the individual’s circumstances into 
account.5 On the other hand, however, it may be extremely difficult for legislators to 
craft laws that are sensitive to individual circumstances yet which still achieve the 
very purposes for which they were enacted in the first place.     
It is elementary that the majority of human rights, and certainly those in the 
ECHR, are not absolute. Most may be subject to limitations in pursuit of legitimate 
policy objectives, as long as those limitations constitute only a proportionate 
interference with the rights concerned.6 Whilst its exact contours are hotly contested,7 
it nevertheless seems clear that the principle of proportionality would (on the face of 
it anyway) suggest that an inflexible law which impacts (without exception) on the 
human rights of all who fall within its scope – even where their circumstances mean 
that the provision’s policy aim will not be furthered by impacting upon them in a 
particular case – will fall foul of it. This, however, is not always the case. 
In 2003 Philip Sales and Ben Hooper reviewed the Strasbourg approach to the 
proportionality of what they termed ‘fact insensitive laws’ (where a ‘law’s fact 
sensitivity is the degree to which the outcome of applying it depends on the detailed 
factual context in which it is applied’).8 In this regard they identified both cases where 
inflexible blanket bans led the Court to favour the individuated approach, and hold 
that the interference with the right in question was disproportionate,9 as well as other 
cases where the Court erred in favour of certainty and found the state’s inflexible 
rules to be proportionate.10 In light of the relevant case law, Sales and Hooper made a 
number of suggestions about the factors that ought to influence the Court in 
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(art 8); Tinnelly and McElduff v UK, App nos 20390/92; 21322/93, (1998) 27 EHRR 246, concerning 
the ‘conclusive’ and non-challengeable nature of certifications on security grounds that the applicants 
had not won contracts (art 6); and Papachelas v Greece, App no 31423/96, (2000) 30 EHRR 293, 
concerning the inflexible and irrebuttable presumption that land value be reduced by a fixed amount in 
cases of compulsory purchase (art 1 of prot 1). 
10 See eg James v UK, App no 8793/79,  (1986) 8 EHRR 123, concerning the blanket statutory right to 
leasehold enfranchisement on the termination of a long lease, taking no account of the individual 
circumstances of the individual lessee (art 1 of prot 1); Mellacher v Austria, App no 10522/83,  (1990) 
12 EHRR 392, concerning the inflexible reduction of rents without taking account of individual 
circumstances (art 1 of prot 1); Stubbings v UK , App no 22083/93, (1996) 23 EHRR 213, concerning 
the inflexible operation of the Limitation Act (art 6); and Pretty v UK, App No 2346/0-2, (2002) 35 
EHRR 1, concerning the statutory blanket prohibition on assisted suicide (art 8). 
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applications involving fact-insensitive laws. These are: whether a more fact sensitive 
law would frustrate the pursuit of the state’s policy aim or is required to ensure 
efficient use of limited resources; whether the accurate achievement of the state’s 
policy aim is more important to society than the avoidance of any other consequences 
that a more fact sensitive law would entail; whether the state may properly wish to 
reduce the discretion afforded to those whose function it is to apply a particular law; 
and whether other contracting states have adopted fact insensitive laws to pursue the 
policy at issue. However, in spite of their detailed analysis, the authors were forced to 
concede with respect to the tension between flexibility and certainty that: 
‘[u]nfortunately the ECtHR does not in its judgments expressly address this tension, 
nor has it sought to give clear guidance as to how it should be resolved’.11 
Furthermore, ‘[t]here [wa]s … a lack of detailed guidance from Strasbourg regarding 
how a court should approach a proportionality challenge based on the relative fact 
insensitivity of a particular law’.12   
In the years since Sales and Hooper conducted their research, there has been a 
fresh development. What has since emerged in the case law of the ECtHR, as a 
significant factor in determining the human rights compliance of fact-insensitive laws, 
is the quality and extent of the deliberation and debate by domestic parliaments. 13 
Broadly speaking, the Court has shown itself to be more willing to accept the 
legitimacy of blanket bans if there has been a rigorous legislative debate at national 
level, and it is to this issue that we now turn.   
 
A. Blanket Bans, Proportionality And ‘Proper Debate’ 
 
The paradigm case illustrating the role of domestic debate in Strasbourg 
proportionality analysis is Animal Defenders International v UK, which concerned the 
statutory ban on all broadcast political advertisements in the UK.14 This ban was 
justified by the state on the grounds both of safeguarding the impartiality of 
broadcasters, and of preventing the distortion of the democratic process by wealthy 
actors buying up large swathes of airtime and flooding them with their own political 
messages.  The ban however was very wide in its scope, so as to catch not just 
moneyed interests but also those who posed no risk to the democratic process, such as 
the applicant in the case – an animal rights NGO that wished to broadcast an 
advertisement publicizing the poor treatment of primates by humans.15 When Animal 
Defenders reached the Grand Chamber of the Court, in seemingly going against its 
approach in earlier cases where it had emphasized the importance of a fact-sensitive 
approach in relation to bans on political advertising, 16 it found there to be no violation 
of article 10.17 In a striking passage the Court, referring to the blanket ban as a 
‘general measure’, laid out its prescription for process-based review in such cases:  
 
… in order to determine the proportionality of a general measure, the Court 
must primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it. The quality of 
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12 Ibid 454. 
13 Arnardóttir (n 1). 
14 Animal Defenders International v UK, App No 48876/08, (2013) 57 EHRR 21. 
15 Earlier Strasbourg case law indicated that such wide bans would breach art 10: see VgT Verein 
Gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland, App No 24699/94, (2002) 34 EHRR 4 and TV Vest AS & Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v Norway, App No 21132/05, (2009) 48 EHRR 51. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 102-4. 
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parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure [under 
consideration] is of particular importance in this respect, including to the 
operation of the relevant margin of appreciation.18  
 
The Grand Chamber thus held that the quality of domestic process goes directly to the 
proportionality of the measure in question, and helps to determine the width of the 
margin of appreciation.  The Court then went on to explain that an inflexible rule 
might nevertheless be found proportionate where ‘case by case examination would 
give rise to the risk of significant uncertainty of litigation, expense and delay as well 
as of discrimination and arbitrariness.’19 Consequently, the ‘more convincing the 
general justifications for the general measures were’, the less importance the Court 
would attach to its impact in a ‘particular case’. 20 Crucially, the Court noted that the 
UK parliament (and courts) had subjected the ban to ‘exacting and pertinent’ 
reviews.21 Moreover the statute had been passed ‘with cross party support and without 
any dissenting voice’ and it was the ‘culmination of an exceptional examination by 
parliamentary bodies of the cultural, political and legal aspects of the prohibition as 
part of the broader regulatory system governing broadcasted public interest 
expression …’.22  
This process-based approach was echoed in The National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers v UK, which concerned the statutory blanket 
prohibition on secondary strike action.23 The Court referred to the parliamentary 
debates during the initial enactment of the ban in 1980, which made clear the 
legislative intention to ‘strike a new balance’ in industrial relations in the interests of 
the broader economy – a balance which was fine tuned in later legislation in 1992.  
This legislation was ‘sharply contested by the opposition in Parliament’,24 but because 
the subject matter here related to ‘social and economic strategy’, the Court allowed a 
wider margin of appreciation since ‘national authorities, and in particular the 
democratically elected parliaments’, ‘are in principle better placed than the 
international judge to appreciate what is in the public interest on social or economic 
grounds’.25 The Court noted that the ban had ‘remained intact for over 20 years, 
notwithstanding two changes of government during that time’ denoting a ‘democratic 
consensus in support of it and an acceptance of the reasons for it’.26 
Whilst cases like Animal Defenders and NURMTW provide clear and explicit 
illustrations of the procedural-turn, it can also be discerned, albeit in a less obvious 
way, in sensitive cases involving blanket legislative bans on forms of religious dress – 
in particular the Islamic face veil. For example, in SAS v France, which concerned a 
French Law (passed in 2010) that prohibited the covering of one’s face in the public 
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radio in the Republic of Ireland. 
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24 Ibid, para 89. 
25 Ibid, para 90. 
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space, the Grand Chamber cited at length the legislative history of the ban.27 Faced 
with an extremely controversial and sensitive issue – and, but for the description of it 
in the first part of the judgment, without making detailed reference to the legislative 
process – the Grand Chamber commented that it was:   
 
… important to emphasise the fundamentally subsidiary role of the 
Convention mechanism.  The national authorities have direct democratic 
legitimation and are … in principle better placed than an individual court to 
evaluate local needs and conditions.  In matters of general policy, on which 
opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ, the role of the 
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.28 
 
In referring directly to the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the Bill – but 
not to the legislative debate itself – the Court held that the ban was a proportionate 
means to ensure the principle of ‘living together’. Whilst acknowledging the problems 
that the ban caused for individual Muslim women,29 the Court nevertheless concluded 
that the question of whether one should be permitted to wear the full-face veil in 
public constituted a ‘choice of society’.30 
Some commentators have suggested that SAS does not constitute an example 
of process-based review, since the Court did not pay close attention to the existence of 
an elaborate nationwide debate.31 However Judge Angelika Nussberger, writing extra-
judicially, has suggested that this case is indeed illustrative of process-based review. 
She maintains that whilst, ‘on the surface’, the Court in SAS considered all the ‘pros 
and cons of the prohibition of wearing the burka in public and entered into an in-depth 
debate of all the arguments advanced by the French government’ at the same time the 
main message of the judgment is that the blanket ban on wearing the burka in public 
is justifiable as a “choice of society”’.32 Thus, she says, the legislative procedure so 
extensively described in the first part of the judgment ‘did not only matter, but was a 
dominant aspect of the case.’ In this sense, Judge Nussberger argues that there is not 
only an explicit, but also an implicit, process-based review: ‘[w]herever the Court 
accepts the “choice of society” based on a democratic decision-making process, it can 
be assumed that in the Court’s view, the procedure which led to this decision fulfilled 
all the requirements’.33 
If there were any doubt about whether the Court in SAS was in fact engaging 
in process-based review such doubts were dispelled in the subsequent Belgian face-
covering cases of Belcacemi and Oussa and Dakir.34 In these cases the Court referred 
expressly to ‘the decision-making process leading to the impugned ban’ which, it 
stated approvingly, ‘took several years and was marked by a wide debate within the 
House of Representatives and by a detailed and thorough examination by the 
Constitutional Court of all interests involved.’35 
                                                        
27 SAS v France, App No 43835/11, (2015) 60 EHRR 11, paras 15-27. 
28 Ibid, para 129. 
29 Ibid, para 145-9. 
30 Ibid, para 153. See also Belcacemi and Oussar v Belgium, App No 37798/13, ECHR 11 July 2017, 
para 53 and Dakir v Belgium, App No 4619/12, ECHR 11 July 2017, para 56. 
31 J Gerards, ‘Procedural Review by the ECtHR: A Typology’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 145. 
32 A Nussberger, ‘Procedural Review by the European Court of Human Rights: the View from the 
Court’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 163. 
33 Ibid, para 163-4. See also E Brems, ‘SAS v France: A Reality Check’ (2016) 25 Nott LJ 58. 
34 Belcacemi and Oussar and Dakir (n 30). 
35 Ibid Belcacemi and Oussar, para 54 and Dakir, para 57. 
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Cases such as these reveal that where a rights-infringing inflexible blanket ban 
has been introduced, a crucial ingredient in the Court’s assessment of its 
proportionality is whether a debate has taken place in the domestic legislature, in 
which competing rights and interests have been weighed against each other. Where 
there has been such a ‘proper’ debate, this widens the margin of appreciation, 
allowing more weight to be given to the domestic legislature’s assessment of the 
optimal balance to be struck, and thereby increasing the state’s chances of success.  
 
B. Absence Of/Inadequate Debate – When Blanket Bans Are More Likely To Be 
Disproportionate 
 
There is a necessary obverse of the aforementioned process-review coin. Where the 
state introduces a blanket ban, and the ban is held not to have been debated properly 
in a domestic context, this inevitably counts against the state in proportionality terms. 
Thus, for example, in Hirst v UK (No 2), which concerned the statutory prohibition on 
convicted prisoners from voting in the UK, the applicant prisoner challenged the ban 
as being contrary to his right to vote under ECHR article 3 of protocol 1.36 In response 
the UK Government contended that this was an area (ie the organization of 
democracy) in which states have traditionally been afforded a wide margin of 
appreciation, and that there was no evidence of a common European approach on the 
issue of prisoner voting.37 In addition, the Government argued, inter alia, that this ban 
– which in its statutory form dated back to 1870 – had been ‘adhered to over many 
years with the explicit approval of Parliament, most recently in the Representation of 
the People Act 2000, which was accompanied by a statement of compatibility under 
the Human Rights Act’,38 and that the matter had been fully considered by the 
domestic courts in applying the Convention.39 However, in rejecting these arguments, 
the Grand Chamber found that the ban was ‘a blunt instrument’ which constituted an 
‘automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right’.40 
Not content to refer merely to the ban’s arbitrariness, the Grand Chamber proceeded 
to make reference to the domestic parliamentary and judicial procedures that had been 
adverted to by the Government in its submissions.  In dismissing the Government’s 
assertion that this was the ‘choice of Parliament over many years’, the Court stated:  
 
… there is no evidence that Parliament ever has ever sought to weigh the 
competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a blanket ban on the 
right of a convicted prisoner to vote. … It may perhaps be said that, by voting 
the way they did to exempt unconvicted prisoners from the restriction on 
voting, Parliament implicitly affirmed the need for continued restrictions on 
the voting rights of convicted prisoner.  Nonetheless it cannot be said that 
there was any substantive debate by members of the legislature on the 
continued justification in the light of modern day penal policy and of current 
                                                        
36 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium, App No 9267/81, (1988) 10 EHRR 1, para 46-51. The text 
of art 3 prot 1 states: ‘The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the 
people in the choice of the legislature’.  
37 The UK government pointed to at least 13 other Council of Europe states that had a ban on prisoner 
voting. 
38 Hirst v UK (No 2), App No 74025/01, (2004) 38 EHRR 40, para 47. Compare with the absence of 
such a section 19(1)(a) Human Rights Act statement in Animal Defenders (n 14).  
39 Ibid, para 48. 
40 Ibid, para 82. 
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human rights standards for maintaining such a general restriction on the right 
of prisoners to vote.41 
 
Indeed, the Grand Chamber added that the domestic court, in showing deference to 
Parliament, ‘did not undertake any assessment of the proportionality of the measure 
itself’.42 Thus, the failure to debate the issue properly in Parliament significantly 
reduced the state’s margin of appreciation in this context. 
Another case decided in the same vein is Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia 
which concerned the blanket ban on prisoner voting in Russia, as set out in Article 
32(3) of the 1993 Constitution, but reflecting a long tradition going back to the 
nineteenth century.43 The Russian government argued that this case was 
distinguishable from Hirst, because its ban was enshrined in a Constitutional 
provision which had been adopted only after a nationwide vote, and after its terms had 
been subject to ‘extensive public debate at various levels of Russian society’. 
However, the Court observed that the Russian Government had failed to submit 
relevant materials that would have enabled it to consider whether, at any stage of this 
debate, an attempt had been made to ‘weigh the competing interests or to assess the 
proportionality of a blanket ban on convicted prisoner’s voting rights’.44  
These cases suggest that where a rights-infringing inflexible blanket ban has 
been introduced, an important ingredient in the assessment of its proportionality is 
whether a debate has taken place in the domestic legislature in which competing 
interests are weighed against each other. Where blanket bans are imposed, the Court 
looks at the debates that have taken place at national level. Moreover, the Court does 
not merely accept the Government’s word that there has been some debate at face 
value. Rather it will look at whether or not the debate has been the right kind of 
debate, which takes into consideration the human right and weighs it in the balance 
against competing considerations of public policy. 
Given how the Court’s scrutiny of the adequacy of debate at domestic level 
has played a significant part in a number of cases involving blanket bans/general 
measures, it is clearly important to understand the underpinning justifications for this 
procedural turn. It is on this issue that we now focus. 
 
III. THE PROCEDURAL TURN AND SUBSIDIARITY: PRINCIPLE, 
PRAGMATISM AND DIALOGUE 
 
As noted above, there has been a significant amount of academic commentary on the 
alleged shift towards process-based review in European human rights cases.45 
Moreover, in addition to the blanket ban cases discussed earlier, this trend has also 
been evident in cases involving the balancing of competing Convention rights – that 
(in principle) deserve equal respect – in which the Court has said that as long as the 
domestic organs carry out the balancing exercise ‘in conformity with the criteria laid 
down in [its] case law [it] would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that 
of the domestic courts’.46   
                                                        
41 Ibid, para 79. 
42 Ibid, para 80. See also, eg, Alajos Kiss v Hungary, App No 38832/06, (2013) 56 EHRR 38.  
43 Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia, App nos 11157/04 and 15162/05, (4 July 2013). 
44 Ibid, para 109. 
45 See n 1 above. 
46 Most commonly this has been in cases involving arts 8 and 10: see eg Von Hannover v Germany (No 
2), App no 40660/08, (2012) 55 EHRR 15, para 104-7 and Axel Springer AG v Germany, App No 
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Having regard to the trend outlined above the question arises: what is driving 
the Court’s move to process-based review? A common thread in the answers that have 
been suggested by commentators to this question lies in the principle of subsidiarity.47 
Indeed ECtHR Judge Robert Spano has recently argued extra-judicially that ‘process-
based review is the mechanism by which the Court implements the principle of 
subsidiarity in practice’.48 It is therefore to this principle that we proceed.  
 
A. Subsidiarity In The European Convention On Human Rights 
 
Subsidiarity is, in essence, the principle that ‘each social and political group should 
help smaller or more local ones accomplish their respective ends, without arrogating 
those tasks to itself’.49 It can be seen to be inherent in the ‘institutional design’50 of 
the Convention itself in Articles 1,51 13,52 19,53 35(1)54 which are textual 
embodiments of the principle that primary responsibility for rights protection lies with 
States parties.55 Moreover, the subsidiary role of the ECtHR has long been 
emphasized by the Court itself.56 Subsidiarity is especially pertinent in cases where 
difficult balances have to be struck between rights and competing interests or rights – 
balances on which reasonable people may well disagree – and on which there may be 
significant differences across Council of Europe states, driven by cultural and social 
factors. In this context the principle of subsidiarity can be justified on a two-fold 
basis: on the grounds of democratic legitimacy (ie that bodies at domestic level are 
directly democratically accountable to their people); and also epistemically, on the 
                                                                                                                                                              
39954/08, (2012) 55 EHRR 6, para 85-8. See further M Saul, ‘Structuring evaluations of parliamentary 
processes by the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 20(8) IJHR 1077; Popelier and Van de 
Heyning (2017) (n 1); and Gerards (n 31) who argues that the procedural turn is evident in so called 
‘dilemma cases’ (of which blanket ban cases form a significant proportion), and cases involving the 
balancing of competing Convention rights. 
47 See generally the sources cited at n 1 above. 
48 Spano (2018) (n 1) 481.  
49 PG Carozza, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ (2003) 97 
AmJIL 38. See also J Christoffersen, Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Brill 2009); A Mowbray, ‘Subsidiarity and the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (2015) 15(2) HRLR 313; A Føllesdal, ‘Subsidiarity and international 
human rights courts: respecting self-governance and protecting human rights – or neither? (2016) 79 
Law and Contemporary Problems 147, 148; S Besson, ‘Subsidiarity in International Human Rights 
Law – What is Subsidiary about Human Rights’ (2016) 61(1) The American Journal of Jurisprudence 
69; Kleinlein (n1); and European Court of Human Rights Background Paper, ‘Subsidiarity: A Two-
Sided Coin?’, ECtHR Seminar to mark the official opening of the judicial year 30 January 2015 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2015_ENG.pdf> 
50 A Von Staden, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of Judicial Review Beyond the State: Normative and 
Judicial Standards of Review’ (2012) 10 IJCL 1023, 1036.  
51 The High Contracting Parties have the obligation to secure Convention rights to all those within their 
jurisdictions. 
52 There is a right to an effective remedy before a national tribunal for those whose rights have been 
violated. See M Kuijer, ‘The right to a fair trial and the Council of Europe’s efforts to ensure effective 
remedies on a domestic level for excessively lengthy proceedings’ (2013) 13(4) HRLR 779, 785. 
53 The Court is established to ensure the observance of the Convention by the States Parties. 
54 The Court may only deal with a matter after ‘all domestic remedies have been exhausted’. 
55 See Background Paper (n 49), para 2; and Mowbray (n 49) 319. See also eg Austin v UK, App No 
39629/09, (2012) 55 EHRR 14, in which the Court said: ‘Subsidiarity is at the very basis of the 
Convention, stemming as it does from a joint reading of Articles 1 and 19’, para 61; and Kudla v 
Poland, App No 30201/96, (2002) 35 EHRR 11, para 155. 
56 In the very early Belgian Linguistics Case, 23 July 1968, Series A No 6 35, para 10 the Court 
referred to the ‘subsidiary nature of the international machinery of collective enforcement established 
by the Convention’.  
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basis that bodies at state level are in a better position because of their superior 
knowledge of local conditions (ie they are better placed to strike difficult balances 
than the ECtHR).57   
In recent years the role of subsidiarity has been a central message in the 
Declarations emanating from all the High Level Council of Europe Conferences: 
Interlaken,58 Izmir,59 Brighton,60 Brussels,61 and Copenhagen.62 Indeed, Protocol 15 
emerged from the Brighton Conference, which amends the Preamble of the 
Convention to make specific reference within its text to the principle of subsidiarity 
and the margin of appreciation. 
Subsidiarity is closely related to the margin of appreciation doctrine,63 which 
can be seen as the juridical manifestation of the subsidiarity principle, and has been 
described as the ‘operational tool’ for its realisation in that it ‘safeguards space for the 
national authorities to perform the balance of rights and interests in the adjudication 
of human rights’.64 Both doctrines help to ensure that respect for Convention rights 
lies first and foremost with states’ authorities – rather than with the Court – and that 
the Court should only intervene when the domestic authorities fail in that task.65  
Although it is undoubtedly the case that subsidiarity has always been part of 
the Convention, and recognized as such by the ECtHR, the High Level Conferences 
since Interlaken have given it a new impetus.   In part this renewed emphasis can be 
ascribed to the long-standing difficulties that the Court has encountered in dealing 
with its docket, leading to a long backlog of cases. The argument for subsidiarity is 
directly relevant to an alleviation of the Court’s case load – for the more cases that are 
dealt with by domestic bodies, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, the fewer 
the number of applications that are likely to end up coming before the ECtHR.66 In 
                                                        
57 M Saul (n 1) 28; L Lazarus and N Simmonson, ‘Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate: 
Enriching the Doctrine of Due Deference’ in Hunt et al (n 1) 388, 390. 
58 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Interlaken 
Declaration’ (19 Feb 2010) especially at 1 and 3 available at: 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2010_Interlaken_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> 
59 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Izmir Declaration’ 
(27 April 2011) especially at 1 and 3-5 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> 
60 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights ‘Brighton 
Declaration’ (20 April 2012) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf> 
61 High Level Conference on the ‘Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our 
shared responsibility’ ‘Brussels Declaration’ (27 March 2015) 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Brussels_Declaration_ENG.pdf> 
62 High Level Conference on the European Human Rights System in the Future of Europe 
‘Copenhagen Declaration’ (13 April 2018) <https://rm.coe.int/copenhagen-declaration/16807b915c>. 
63 In one of the earliest applications of the margin of appreciation, the Court expressly linked 
subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation. See Handyside v UK, App No 5493/72, (1976) 1 EHRR 
737, para 48. On the margin of appreciation see eg MR Hutchinson, ‘The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the European Court of Human Rights’ (1999) 48(3) ICLQ 638 and D McGoldrick, ‘A 
Deference of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument for its Application by the Human Rights 
Committee’ 65(1) ICLQ 21. 
64 Brighton Declaration (n 60), para 11; Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 7; Popelier and Van de 
Heyning (2017) (n 1) 9; R Spano, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and National Courts: A 
Constructive Conversation or a Dialogue of Disrespect (2015) 33(1) Nordic JHR 1, 4; and Background 
Paper (n 49), para 16.  
65 E Brems, ‘The “Logics” of Procedural Type Review by the European Court of Human Rights’ in  
Gerards and Brems (n 1) 22-24; Interlaken Declaration (n 58) 1; Izmir Declaration (n 59) 1; and 
Brighton Declaration (n 60), paras 3, 11 and 12.  
66 Brighton Declaration (n 60), paras 5-8. 
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addition, many argue that if the subsidiarity principle is not respected, the Court will 
inevitably face a crisis of legitimacy.67 Indeed, in some quarters, the Court has been 
accused of frequently exceeding its mandate and over-reaching itself.68 As Popelier 
and Van de Heyning note, ‘what started as a case of overload crisis slid further into a 
perceived legitimacy crisis, with critical voices reproaching the Court for judicial 
activism and intruding into domestic affairs’.69  The former President of the ECtHR, 
Dean Spielmann, has suggested that: 
 
[t]he future imagined at Brighton [as well as, it might now be added, at 
Copenhagen] is one where the center of gravity of the Convention system 
should be lower than it is today, closer temporally and spatially to all 
Europeans, and to all those under the protection of the Convention.70 
 
The connection between subsidiarity and the procedural turn is as follows: where the 
quality of debate at national level is strong, then the Court should fully embrace its 
subsidiary role and approach the measure in question with a presumption of deference 
to be rebutted only by weighty considerations. Conversely, where the quality of the 
national debate is weak, the Court will be much less willing to adopt a deferential 
posture.71   
 
B. Procedural Turn And Subsidiarity – A Principled Move? 
 
Process-based review, on one view, can be seen as facilitating a principled devolution 
of decision-making power back to contracting states in accordance with subsidiarity. 
Thus it ensures that subsidiarity is working properly in that ‘better placed’ and 
‘democratically accountable’ national decision makers have the primary role of 
protecting the human rights of those within their jurisdiction – but that there exists a 
control mechanism to ensure that those domestic decision makers do their jobs with 
sufficient procedural rigour and diligence, having due regard to their human rights 
obligations. Clearly this devolution cannot be absolute, for the very existence of a 
European Court of Human Rights must presuppose that, at least occasionally, the 
                                                        
67 See eg Lazareus and Simmonsen (n 57) 320. 
68 See eg David Cameron PM, ‘Speech on the European Court of Human Rights’ 25 January 2012 
available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-on-the-european-court-of-human-
rights>. See also, eg, Lord Sumption, ‘The Limits of Law’ 27th Sultan Azlan Law Lecture 2013 
available at: <http://www.sultanazlanshah.com/pdf/2014%20Book/SAS_Lecture_27.pdf>; Lord 
Hoffmann, The ‘Universality of Human Rights’ 19 March 2009 available at: 
<https://www.judiciary.uk/announcements/speech-by-lord-hoffmann-the-universality-of-human-
rights/>; M Elliott, ‘After Brighton: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ (2012) PL 619; M O’Boyle 
‘The Future of the ECtHR’ (2011) 12 German LJ 1862; A Buyse, The Draft Copenahagen Declaration 
– What About Civil Society?’ (1 March 2018) available at: 
<https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/03/01/the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-what-about-civil-
society/>; and L Hijbers, ‘The Draft Copenhagen Declaration – Process-based review and subsidiarity’ 
(27 Feb 2018) available at: 
https://strasbourgobservers.com/2018/02/27/the-draft-copenhagen-declaration-process-based-review-
and-subsidiarity/. 
69 Popelier and Van de Heyning (n 1); Lazarus and Simmonsen, ‘Judicial Review and Parliamentary 
Debates: enriching the doctrine of due deference’ in Hunt et al (n 1) 390; J Gerards and A Terlouw, 
‘Solutions for the European Court of Human Rights: the Amicus Curiae Project’ in F Spyridon, T 
Zwart and J Fraser (eds), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents: Turning Criticism 
into Strength (Edward Elgar 2013) 165; and A Føllesdal (n 49) 152. 
70 D Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation’ (2014) 67(1) CLP 49, 65. 
71 Lazarus and Simmonsen (n 69) 392. 
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domestic authorities will not strike an adequate balance and the intervention of a 
supranational judicial body is required – for otherwise why would it even exist?72  
In this vein Judge Spano argues that cases like Animal Defenders and Hirst 
represent a ‘qualitative, democracy enhancing approach’ wherein the ‘Court’s 
reformulation or refinement of the principle of subsidiarity, and the margin of 
appreciation, introduces a clear procedural dimension that can be examined on the 
basis of objective factors informed by the defendant government in its pleadings.’73 
At the same time, in acknowledging its subsidiary role in striking a substantive 
balance in hard cases, the use of process-based review nevertheless ensures that the 
process at national level is robust.74  
The position above is well summarized in the Court’s 2015 Background 
Paper, in which it is stated that where a: 
 
…parliament engages in a comprehensive review of the Convention issues at 
stake and conducts a balancing exercise of the relevant competing interests in 
the light of Convention case law, they are carrying out their true mission 
under the Convention and the Court’s scrutiny will be tailored accordingly.75   
 
C. The Procedural Turn And Subsidiarity – A More Pragmatic Explanation? 
 
If the above analysis casts subsidiarity in a principled light, a slightly more pragmatic 
take on the subsidiarity argument for process-based review can be identified: not so 
much that it is driven by an intrinsic respect for the appropriate division of labour 
between institutions based on expertise and democratic accountability, but rather that 
it is a strategic response on the part of the Court to political pressure from states.76 
The Brighton High Level Conference of 2012 and ensuing Brighton 
Declaration, as well as the recent Copenhagen Declaration of 2018, can be seen as the 
result of allegations from within contracting states (most notably the UK, the 
Netherlands, Hungary and Denmark) that the Strasbourg Court has been guilty of 
overreaching itself. Protocol 15 explicitly writes subsidiarity and the margin of 
appreciation into an amended Convention Preamble,77 and although this textual 
amendment is ‘intended to … be consistent with the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation as developed by the Court in its case law’, it nevertheless 
‘unquestionably’ illustrates that the ‘Contracting States wished to send a strong 
message to the Court’.78  
This more pragmatic view of the procedural turn would suggest that it is, in 
fact, a kind of ‘organized retreat’ from substantive review.79 As a way of diffusing 
and/or addressing the disillusionment of state parties in the Strasbourg process, the 
ECtHR is effectively passing the proverbial baton back to the state – back-tracking in 
                                                        
72 Brems (n 65) 26. 
73 Spano (n 1) 499. 
74 A Sathanapally, ‘The Modest Promise of “Procedural Review” in Fundamental Rights Cases’ in 
Gerards and Brems (n 1).  
75 Background Paper (n 49), para 27 (emphasis added).  
76 Arnardottir (2015) (n 1); See also, more generally, S Dothan, ‘Judicial Tactics in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 ChJIL 115. 
77 T Kleinlein, ‘Consensus and Contestability: The ECtHR and he Combined Potential of European 
Consensus and Procedural Rationality Control’ (2017) (28) 3 EJIL 871. 
78 Background Paper (n 49), para 22. 
79 Arnadottir (2015) (n 1). 
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order to stave off criticism, so as not to lose the very support of states upon which its 
efficacy and effectiveness ultimately depend.80   
 
D. Drawing The Sting From The Margin Of Appreciation? 
 
A slightly different emphasis suggested by several commentators is that the Court’s 
increased emphasis on the review of domestic process might be seen as a kind of quid 
pro quo for its increased willingness to show deference, at least in those cases where 
the margin of appreciation afforded by the Court is wide.81 This is to say that process-
based review might be utilized to draw the sting from a wide margin of appreciation, 
and ensures that the level of review is not reduced to one of ‘manifest 
unreasonableness’ or ‘without legal foundation’.82 As Patricia Popelier argues, 
process review gives teeth to otherwise lenient review, enabling the Court to assess 
the rationality of state’s action and avoiding the need to substantively balance 
interests.83 And it is a two way street, for while good process buys the state some 
deference, poor process leads to more stringent review – as demonstrated earlier, for 
example, in the prisoner voting case of Hirst.  
 
E. Process-Based Review And Democratic Dialogue 
 
A related factor explaining and justifying the move to process-based review lies in 
theories of democratic dialogue and deliberation.84 There has been a long running 
debate between legal and political constitutionalists as to who should have the 
ultimate say on the questions of the content and scope of human rights: judges or 
legislators.85 As Sandra Fredman puts it, the: 
 
… basic dilemma of human rights adjudication is easily stated … 
[u]nconstrained decision making by elected representatives may invade the 
basic human rights of individuals and minorities – which is precisely why we 
need human rights; but judges having power to override democratic laws goes 
against the principle that the people make decisions.86  
 
                                                        
80 Popellier and Heyning (2017) (n 1). 
81 P Popelier, ‘Evidence Based Lawmaking: Influences, Obstacles and the Role of the European Court 
of Human Rights’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 79; Gerards (n 31); and Popelier and Van de Heyning 
(2017) (n1).  
82 R Masterman, ‘Process and Substance in Judicial Review in the United Kingdom and at Strasbourg: 
Proportionality, Subsidiarity, Complementarity?’ in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 247. 
83 Patricia Popelier, ‘The Court as Regulatory Watchdog: The Procedural Approach in the Case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights’, in P Popelier, A Mazmanyan and W Vandenbruwaene (eds), 
The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance (Intersentia 2012) 265. 
84 T Kleinlein (n 77); Lazarus and Simmonson (n 69).   
85 See eg JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1; J Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (OUP, 1999); J Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 
Yale LJ 1346; Lazarus and Simmonson (n 69); R Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican 
Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (2007 CUP); R Bellamy, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy 
of International Conventions: Political Constitutionalism and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2015) 25(4) EJIL 1019; and M Tushnet, ‘Taking the Constitution away from the Courts’ 
(Princeton UP 1999). 
86 S Fredman, ‘From Dialogue to Deliberation: Human Rights Adjudication and Prisoners’ Rights to 
Vote’ in Hunt et al (n 1) 447.  
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There is a recognition that balances involving human rights will very often provoke 
disagreement between reasonable people and, in such circumstances, the ultimate 
arbiters on the content of human rights should not necessarily be judges, but might 
more appropriately be those institutions with democratic legitimacy and 
accountability.  
Theories of dialogue posit a middle way between these polar extremes 
whereby human rights are protected by way of democratic dialogue between 
legislatures and courts.87 Judges and parliaments should not be seen as adversaries but 
rather as partners, engaging in conversation, and finding creative ways for the courts 
to complement the democratic process.88 On this view, process-based review, 
whereby the ECtHR examines the legislative process that led to the offending 
measure or act, can be seen as an example of dialogue in operation.89 
The Copenhagen Declaration 2018 emphasizes that, for a system of shared 
responsibility to be effective, there needs to be a:   
 
… a constructive and continuous dialogue between States parties and the 
Court on their respective roles … including the Court’s development of the 
rights and obligations set out in the Convention. Civil society should be 
involved in this dialogue. Such interaction may anchor the development of 
human rights more solidly in European democracies.90 
 
As Lazarus and Simmonson put it: 
 
…rigorous and respectful judicial examination of democratic process 
enhances constitutional dialogue, and increases opportunities for deference, 
heightens transparency with which deference is used, and therefore makes it 
more likely that deference will be accorded, where it has been shown to be 
justified.91   
 
On this theory judgments like Animal Defenders can be seen as the ECtHR listening 
to the considered and reasoned views of democratically accountable actors within the 
UK, taking on board their serious concerns and arguments, and affording a margin of 
appreciation to them accordingly. 
Such dialogic theories also point to the advantage of the positive feedback 
loop – improved quality of deliberation leads to better outcomes in human rights 
terms: process review by courts provides an incentive to improve the caliber of 
democratic process in states.92 As Thomas Kleinlein says, dialogue ‘ensures the 
                                                        
87 See P Hogg and A Bushell, ‘The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t such a bad thing after all)’ (1997) 35 Osgood Hall LJ 75; S Gardbaum, ‘The 
new commonwealth model of constitutionalism: theory and practice’ (CUP 2013); and A Young, 
Democratic Dialogue and the Constitution (OUP 2017). Arguably an exemplar of this dialogic 
approach can be seen in the UK’s HRA – see eg D Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights 
Act’ [2006] PL 722; and T Hickman, ‘Constitutional Dialogue Theories and the HRA 1998’ [2005] PL 
306. 
88 Lazarus and Simmonson (n 69). 
89 The Brighton Declaration (n 60) states that ‘the conference welcomes open dialogues between the 
Court and States Parties as a means of developing an enhanced understanding of their respective roles 
in carrying out their shared responsibility for applying the Convention’, para 12(c).   
90 Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 33. 
91 Lazarus and Simmonsen, (n 69). 
92 A Sathanapally (n 74) 40.   
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avenue for democratic norm contestation is open’ and it ‘incentivizes states to create 
structures to embed Convention standards’. Moreover, it may help to pre-empt 
opportunistic attacks on the ECHR by obliging legislatures to engage with well-
reasoned arguments as to the scope of rights and the balances to be struck.93 
The rationales and reasons for the procedural turn offered by numerous 
authors, and briefly sketched out above, provide persuasive arguments – both 
principled and pragmatic – for Strasbourg’s procedural turn. However, this article will 
now explore some of the drawbacks of the process-based review and, with particular 
reference to cases involving blanket bans, we will argue that a cautious approach is 
warranted.  
 
IV.  THE PROCEDURAL TURN AND BLANKET BANS – IRONIES,  
UNCERTAINTIES AND MINORITIES 
 
A. Consistency and Uncertainty 
 
There is a fundamental irony at the heart of the process-based review, as it has been 
applied to blanket bans. Many blanket bans are introduced to promote certainty – the 
rationale being that they are needed because alternative, more finely-tuned solutions, 
which would allow for the particularities of right holders, are too prone to the 
problems of arbitrariness and abuse. This of course is a prey in aid of the virtue of 
legal certainty – a key characteristic of the rule of law which, in itself, is a vital thread 
running throughout the whole of the Convention.94 Moreover, the role of certainty 
forms a key-note in the 2018 Copenhagen Declaration which states: 
 
The quality and in particular the clarity and consistency of the Court’s 
judgments are important for the authority and effectiveness of the Convention 
system. They provide a framework for national authorities to effectively apply 
and enforce Convention standards at domestic level.95 
 
However, and herein lies the irony, the Court’s resort to the use of process-based 
review is itself open to the charge of major uncertainty at several levels, some of 
which will now be explored.  
 
1. Predictability of case law – as a guide to states 
 
There are a number of reasons why the ECtHR’s taking a procedural turn is 
problematic from the perspective of legal certainty. For a start, there is the issue of the 
predictability of the Court’s case law. As the leading human rights court in Europe it 
is important that the ECtHR’s judgments provide clear guidance to States parties as to 
the substantive human rights standards required in their respective legal systems. 
Whilst the Court is not formally bound by its previous judgments, ‘it is in the interests 
of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, 
                                                        
93 Kleinlein (n 77) 889. 
94 T Bingham, The Rule of Law (Penguin 2011). 
95 Copenhagen Declaration (n 62), para 27 (emphasis added). See also Brighton Declaration (n 60), 
para 23. 
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without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases’.96 However, a 
focus on procedure rather than substantive balance tends to muddy these waters 
considerably. Rather than providing guidance on substantive human rights standards 
and whether, in particular circumstances, there has been a violation of the 
Convention, much will instead depend on whether there has been an appropriate 
legislative debate at municipal level. This will inevitably have unsettling 
consequences in terms of the Court’s case law, perhaps most effectively illustrated by 
way of the following example. Imagine the scenario of two States parties to the 
Convention, Xland and Yland, both of which introduce identical blanket prohibitions 
on activities that fall within the scope of a Convention right. Where one state, Xland 
conducts a full and far reaching debate in its pre-legislative and legislative 
procedures, this will clearly stand it in good stead in terms of any subsequent 
Strasbourg challenge. It will be readily accepted by the Court that this is a ‘choice of 
society’, that the Court has a role which is subsidiary to that of states in protecting 
human rights, and that the margin of appreciation should be wide. Yland has an 
identical measure on its statue books. However, in contrast to Xland, the Ylandian 
ban has been in force since the early 20th century, and there has never been a 
legislative debate as to its compatibility with contemporary human rights norms.97 
Clearly, on the process-based review model, it is far more likely that Yland’s 
provision will be found to violate the ECHR, since the domestic authorities will not 
have conducted their own balancing act in the light of Convention standards and case 
law. This will result in the problematic situation where identical legal provisions in 
different states will be found to be, respectively, compliant and in violation of 
Convention standards, purely on account of the quantity and quality of their domestic 
debates. 
Such a scenario might be considered fanciful, but the context of the Animal 
Defenders litigation may be recalled. The UK’s Communications Act 2003, which re-
enacted and widened an existing statutory ban on broadcast political advertisements, 
was passed in the knowledge that an almost identical prohibition in Switzerland 
enacted for the same reasons – to prevent distortion of the democratic process by 
wealthy interests, and to protect broadcaster impartiality – had been found to be a 
breach of article 10 ECHR in VgT v Switzerland. This was because the broadcast ban 
did not sufficiently take into account the fact that the applicant, an impecunious 
animal rights organization, presented no such threat to democracy.98 Indeed, it was 
almost certainly only because of this earlier Strasbourg ruling that the UK 
parliamentary organs reviewed the legislation in so ‘exacting and pertinent’ a 
manner.99 Had VgT not been so decided, it is highly unlikely that such reviews would 
have occurred (at least to the extent that they were), for a large part of the debate was 
                                                        
96 Christine Goodwin v UK, App No 28957/95, (2002) 35 EHRR 18, para 74; Bayatyan v Armenia, 
App No 23459/03, (2012) 54 EHRR 15, para 98; and E Brems and L Lavrysen ‘Procedural Justice in 
Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 35(1) HRQ 176, 186. 
97 The same could be said if Yland passed its measure without debate more recently, or indeed, after 
the judgment in Xland’s case is handed down. 
98 VgT (n 15), para 75. In the domestic incarnation of Animal Defenders, R (Animal Defenders 
International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 1 AC 1312, Lord Bingham 
commented that the ‘facts in VgT were very similar to those in the present case’, para 9. See T Lewis, 
‘Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg 
Jitters?’ (2014) 77(3) 460. 
99 Animal Defenders (n 14), paras 42-55 the Court summarized the domestic debate and the impact that 
VgT had on the legislative deliberations.  
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centered on why VgT should not be followed.100 And had VgT never happened it 
would no doubt have been assumed by the UK legislative bodies that the regulation of 
broadcast advertising would fall within the state’s margin of appreciation, which is 
traditionally wide in such matters. In short, the UK debates and reviews were only so 
‘exacting and pertinent’ as a result of legal happenstance.   
In December 2008 after VgT, but before ADI, the ECtHR reaffirmed its 
position in TV Vest and Rogaland Pensioners Party v Norway, despite an intervention 
by the UK government in which it was argued that VgT should be either overturned or 
confined to its precise facts.101 In neither VgT nor TV Vest was any emphasis placed 
by the Court on the quality of parliamentary debates that led to the bans. In both 
Switzerland and Norway – and in Denmark which changed its law to comply with 
what it considered to be its Convention obligations – the judgments led to the 
respective parliaments changing the law in order to comply with what was no doubt 
presumed to be a statement of substantive legal principle by the ECtHR.102 But then 
the Grand Chamber, in ADI, held that such bans may be permissible where parliament 
has properly debated them. One might wonder what would have happened if, instead 
of changing the law, the legislatures in Switzerland, Norway and Denmark had, 
rather, conducted full debates along the lines of that in the UK parliament. Would 
these have insulated them from further challenge at Strasbourg? And what, now, if 
those state parties decided to re-establish their blanket bans, only this time ensuring 
that the legislatures fully debate them in ‘exacting and pertinent’ fashion’? 
As the dissenting Judges Ziemele, Sajó, Kalaydjieva, Vučinič and De Gaetano 
argued, this approach runs the risk of establishing a ‘double standard within the 
context of a Convention whose minimum standards should be equally applicable to all 
the States parties to it’. How could ‘essentially identical’ general prohibitions on 
political advertising be, respectively, ‘not necessary in Swiss [and Norwegian and 
Danish] democratic society, but … proportionate and a fortiori necessary’ in the UK’s 
democratic society?103 In the absence of a clear explanation, the position is now 
undoubtedly one of uncertainty across Europe. 
 
2. Blanket bans as a remedy to uncertainty 
 
There is a further irony at the heart of utilizing process-based review in blanket ban 
cases. As described in Part 1, above, a broadly framed law which is designed to 
pursue a particular legitimate goal, but casts its net so wide as to interfere with human 
rights and takes no account of the circumstances of the individual appears (prima 
facie) to be disproportionate: the less fact-sensitive a measure is, the less likely it is to 
be found substantively proportionate. Accordingly, the Court’s procedural turn case 
law sends an ironic signal: the more suffocating the blanket, the more the Court will 
eschew an in concreto review of the substance of the circumstances of the claimant 
and the more it will rely on the quality of legislative debate that resulted in the 
enactment of the measure. So the less fact sensitive the measure is – the more it will 
be insulated from substantive proportionality review, and the more attention will be 
                                                        
100 Ibid, in particular at paras 53-5.  
101 TV Vest (n 15), para 55. 
102 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 67, citing the 2006 report of the European Platform of Regulatory 
Authorities. 
103 Joint dissent of Judges Ziemele, Sajó, Kalaydjieva, Vučinič and De Gaetano. Judge Spano (2018) (n 
1) 20 denies that this will be the case. See Lewis (n 98) 472. 
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paid to domestic process. To repeat the words of the majority of the Grand Chamber 
in Animal Defenders:  
 
 … in order to determine the proportionality of a general measure, the Court 
must primarily assess the legislative choices underlying it … [t]he quality of 
parliamentary and judicial review of the necessity of the measure is of 
particular importance in this respect, including to the operation of the relevant 
margin of appreciation.104 
 
As will be recalled, one of the main reasons proffered for the enactment of blanket 
bans is the intrinsic difficulty and sensitivity of the subject matter in such cases and, 
in particular, the uncertainty induced by the need for the drawing of fine distinctions 
between those to whom the rule should apply and those to whom it should not. In 
other words, the need to avoid acrimonious disputes by way of a ‘bright line rule’ and 
the need to protect the vulnerable.105 If the legislative debate illustrates that such 
reasons lie behind the blanket ban, this will then seem to have the effect of letting the 
state “off the hook” in substantive proportionality terms. Thus the Court – because of 
claimed sensitivity and the difficulty of drawing fine lines at national level – buys into 
the argument and itself avoids conducting that full substantive review which would 
give the applicant the opportunity to demonstrate that the inference with his/her rights 
is disproportionate.  As Judges Ziemele, Sajó, Kalaydjieva, Vučinić and De Gaetano 
phrased it in their joint dissent in Animal Defenders: 
 
The fact that a general measure was enacted in a fair and careful manner by 
Parliament should not alter the duty incumbent upon the Court to apply the 
established standards that serve for the protection of fundamental human 
rights.  Nor does the fact that a particular topic is debated (possibly 
repeatedly) by the legislature necessarily mean that the conclusion reached by 
the legislature is Convention compliant; and nor does such (repeated) debate 
alter the margin of appreciation accorded to the state.  Of course a thorough 
parliamentary debate may help the Court to understand the pressing social 
need for the interference in a given society. In the spirit of subsidiarity, such 
explanation is a matter for honest consideration. In the present judgment, 
however, excessive importance has been attributed to the process of 
generating the general measure …’.106 
 
In a speech in 2015, the Vice President of the French Conseil d’État, Jean Marc Sauvé 
– whilst supportive of the procedural turn and the role of subsidiarity – made the point 
that ‘national authorities expect the Court to take positions which are stable and 
coherent and to provide case-law positions, so that they can rule with certainty on the 
situations submitted to them without running the risk of subsequent disavowal.’107  
Clearly this expectation may be difficult to meet following the procedural turn. 
                                                        
104 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 108. See also Shindler (n 22), para 117; and NURMTW (n 23), para 
101. 
105 Animal Defenders (n 14), para 122. See also Shindler (n 22), para 116; and NURMTW (n 23), para 
102-3. 
106 Animal Defenders (n 14) dissent of Judge Ziemele et al, para 9-10, emphasis in original. See also 
NURMTW (n 23) concurring opinion of Judges Ziemele, Hirvelä and Bianku, para 2. 
107 Jean-Marc Sauvé, ’The role of the national authorities’, speech at seminar organised by the ECtHR 
‘Subsidiarity: a two sided coin’ 30 January 2015, 9 
<https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20150130_Seminar_JMSauv%C3%A9_ENG.pdf> 
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3. Uncertainty of usage – when is process-based review used? 
 
A related kind of uncertainty lies in the ‘lack of clarity and consistency’ with which 
the ECtHR in fact utilizes process-based review. States are offered ‘little guidance’ by 
the Court in its case law ‘as they can hardly know in advance how the Court will go 
about reviewing decisions taken by the legislature or by national courts’.108  For 
example, it will be recalled that one of the factors leading to the finding of a violation 
of the right to vote under article 3 protocol 1 in Hirst was that there had been no 
meaningful parliamentary debate on the issue.  The issue of prisoner voting was 
subsequently considered in Scoppola v Italy (no 3).109 Under Italian law prisoners 
sentenced to between five years and life permanently lost the right to vote, even after 
release; those imprisoned for between three and five years were disenfranchised for 
five years; and those sentenced to three years or less received no ban. The Grand 
Chamber held that this scheme demonstrated the ‘legislature’s concern to adjust the 
application of the measure to the particular circumstances of the case in hand, taking 
into account such factors as the gravity of the offence committed and the conduct of 
the offender’.110 However, it is notable that, beyond this assertion, there was no 
reference in the judgment to the presence, or absence, of parliamentary debate on the 
issue of prisoner disenfranchisement. As Judge Björgvinsson said in his lone 
dissenting judgment, the Italian legislation – ‘just like’ the United Kingdom’s ban – 
was a ‘blunt instrument stripping of their Convention right to vote a significant 
number of persons and doing so in an indiscriminate manner and to a large extent 
regardless of the nature of their crimes and the length of their sentences and their 
individual circumstances’.111 Indeed it can be argued that the Italian ban was more 
severe than that in the UK, for many Italian prisoners continue to be disenfranchised 
even after release, whereas British prisoners regain the vote immediately they leave 
prison. Despite this however, as Judge Björgvinsson noted in Scoppola, there was no 
evidence adduced to the Court that the Italian legislature had made a ‘sufficient 
assessment of proportionality … as regards the justification for depriving all these 
prisoners in Italy of their voting rights beyond the end of their prison sentence, and in 
many of them for life.’112  
There is apparently, therefore, a lack of consistency in usage, which has even 
led some commentators to suggest that it is only utilized in cases from certain 
countries. For example, Popelier and Van de Heyning have argued that the use of 
process-based review by the court ‘risks being criticized as selective in that the Court 
appears to undertake such review only in respect of cases from certain (openly 
critical) countries’ such as the UK. As such, they maintain that ‘procedural review 
might not be conceived as a necessary tool to strike the balance between the Court’s 
supervisory role and the subsidiarity of the Convention, but rather as a method to 
canalize and mitigate the protests from the UK’.113  
 
                                                        
108 Gerards in Gerards and Brems (n 1) 159; Saul (n 1) (2015) 15 and Saul (n 46) 1082.  
109 Scoppola v Italy (no 3), App No 126/05, (2013) 56 EHRR 19. 
110 Ibid, para 106.   
111 Ibid Judge Björgvinsson dissent. 
112 Ibid. See Fredman (n 86) 462. 
113 P Popelier and C Van de Heyning (2017) (n 1). See also Gerards (n 31) who makes the same point 
in relation to Lindheim v Norway, 143, and X and Others v Austria, 148, in which procedural review 
was not used.   
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4. Uncertainty as what constitutes a good debate 
 
A further area of uncertainty, in addition to those adumbrated above, is what kind of 
legislative debate ought to be considered optimal, and therefore ‘earn the right’ to 
process-based review? After all, there exist no clear criteria by which the Court can 
accurately and consistently measure or assess the quality of parliamentary debate.114  
In Animal Defenders the ECtHR spoke in approving terms of the scrutiny by the 
domestic legislature, accepting their word that a wide blanket ban was necessary 
because of the problems associated with more finely tuned regimes. However, as the 
dissenting Judges Tulkens et al pointed out, the UK failed to carry out an 
investigation into the actual feasibility or workability of any proposed alternative 
regime.115 Thus the Court, in effect, simply accepted the UK legislature’s view that 
the blanket prohibition was the only viable option, without providing strong evidence 
of having explored other possible alternatives.   
By the same token, in Hirst, the ECtHR emphasized the lack of parliamentary 
debate on the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement. Yet in the UK parliament a debate 
was subsequently conducted, initiated by a private members motion, in which the 
overwhelming majority of the House of Commons voted to retain the blanket ban.116 
Indeed the UK, as a third party intervener in Scoppola (3), made specific reference to 
this debate,117 as part of its argument that the issue fell within the state’s margin of 
appreciation and that the Court’s findings in Hirst were ‘wrong’ and should be 
revisited.118 These arguments, however, clearly failed to convince the Court and were 
to no avail. Thus, the extent to which the presence or absence of a parliamentary 
debate is relevant remains highly questionable.  
Issues such as what constitutes the right kind of process, and what is the 
relevance of an overwhelming democratic mandate in favour of a rights infringing 
measure, continue to be far from clear. A brief recap of the cases introduced in Part 1 
above will help illustrate the point.  Recall that in Animal Defenders, the relevant 
legislation was passed without a single dissenting voice, and this was considered by 
the Court to be indicative of an overwhelming democratic mandate. Similarly, in the 
face-cover cases – SAS, Belcacemi and Oussar and Dakir – overwhelming 
parliamentary majorities in favour of the blanket bans on face-coverings in public 
space were held to indicate ‘a balance that has been struck by means of a democratic 
process within the society in question’ and a ‘choice of society’.119 Furthermore, in 
NURMTW the ban on secondary strike action introduced by legislation in 1980 and 
1992 whilst it had been ‘sharply contested at the time’,120 had nevertheless ‘remained 
intact for over twenty years, notwithstanding two changes in government during that 
                                                        
114 Saul (n 1) 1082. 
115 Animal Defenders (n 14), dissent of Judges Tulkens et al, para 17.  
116 Hansard HC Deb 10 February 2011, Vol 523, col 493-586. The House voted by 234 to 22 against 
loosening the restrictions on prisoner voting. See Fredman (n 86) 463ff. For differing views on the 
question of whether the debate was a genuine substantive consideration of the human rights issues, or 
whether the ECtHR had exceeded its authority see (respectively) D Nicol, ‘Legitimacy of the 
Commons vote on prisoner voting’ [2011] PL 681 and J King, ‘Should Prisoners have the Right to 
Vote’ UK Constitutional Law Group Blog (8 May 2011), available at:  
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/05/18/jeff-king-should-prisoners-have-the-right-to-vote/>. 
117 Scoppola (109), para 79. 
118 Ibid, para 75-80. 
119 SAS (n 27) 153-4; Belcacemi and Oussar (n 30), para 53; Dakir (n 30), para 56. 
120 NURMTW (n 23), para 89. 
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time’.121 This, the ECtHR suggested, denoted ‘a democratic consensus in support of 
[the ban]’, and an ‘acceptance of the reasons for it’, which ‘span a broad spectrum of 
political opinion’.122 However it might be considered difficult to see how this 
‘democratic consensus’ differs meaningfully from that in Hirst, where the ban in 
question had been in place since 1870 but where, in stark contrast, this was said to be 
problematic, because it had never been debated in light of modern human rights 
standards.123 Similarly, in the Russian prisoner voting ban case Anchugov and 
Gladkov,124 it will be recalled that this ban had been introduced by the Constitution in 
1993, which itself had been affirmed by a nationwide vote and preceded by 
nationwide public discussion and debate at all levels of society.125 Such a plebiscitary 
mandate would certainly seem to be a good indication that the provisions of the 
Constitution amounted to a ‘choice of society’, at least to the same extent as, say, the 
veil bans in France and Belgium. However, in Anchugov and Gladkov, the Court 
observed that the government had submitted no relevant materials that would enable it 
to consider whether any attempt had been made to ‘weigh the competing interests or 
to assess the proportionality of the blanket ban’ – so Russia was found to be in breach 
of article 1 protocol 3 of the Convention.126  
A fundamental uncertainty is evident in the aforementioned cases: an absence 
of debate over a long period might be interpreted as indicating a wholesale democratic 
acceptance of a state of affairs. Or, in contrast, it might be seen as indicative of a 
failure to engage properly with the human rights arguments in the light of present day 
conditions.127 As Nussberger notes, ‘a unanimous vote in parliament can be 
interpreted in different ways – either as a consequence of the lack of inclusiveness in 
the democratic process and a suppression of the views of the opposition, or as a 
realistic mirror of the wishes and attitudes held in a certain society’.128  
It is evidently the case that across Europe there exists a wide diversity of 
democratic systems, and a commonly repeated trope of the ECtHR’s case law is that it 
is for each state to ‘mould its own democratic vision’.129 Given this diversity the 
Court’s assessments will ‘necessarily be impressionistic’.130 For the Court to attempt 
to develop a set of common standards that could be applied uniformly would be an 
extremely challenging task, and one that is arguably ‘beyond what is feasible for a 
court to develop via case law alone’.131 After all, what might count as an excellent 
debate in one forum might not be considered as such in another, and what might be 
seen as ‘exceptional balancing’ by judges might ‘struggle to resonate in a 
                                                        
121 Ibid, para 99. 
122 Ibid. 
123 See the dissent of Judge Wildhaber et al in Hirst, para 7: ‘It must be assumed that section 3 of the 
Representation of the People Act 2000 reflects political, social and cultural values in the United 
Kingdom’. 
124 Anchugov and Gladkov (n 43). 
125 Ibid, para 109.  
126 Ibid. 
127 See the questions posed in the Third Party Intervention, ‘European Court Of Human Rights Fouzia 
Dakir v Belgium, Application No. 4619/12. Written submission by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent 
University’, 6  <http://www.hrc.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Dakir_hrc.pdf> 
128 Nussberger (n 32) 168. 
129 Yabloko Russian United Democratic Party And Others v Russia, App No 18860/07, 8 Nov 2016, 
para 87; Zdanoka v Latvia, App No 34932/00, (2007) 45 EHRR 17, para 103; Anchugov and Gladkov 
(n 43), para 95; and A Donald and P Leach, ‘The Role of Parliaments Following Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ in Hunt et al (n 1) 59. 
130 Sathanapally (n 74) 75. 
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parliamentary setting’.132 As Aileen Kavanagh observes: ‘political persuasion is not 
the same as legal interpretation’ so parliamentary debates have a very different 
function to that of the courts.133   
In light of the above, there exists the risk that, in reviewing and assessing 
parliamentary debates, the ECtHR will be seen to be lecturing parliaments on “how to 
do their job”. As dissenting Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Lorenzen, Kovler and Jebens 
said in Hirst, ‘it is not for the Court to prescribe the way in which national legislatures 
carry out their legislative functions’.134 Moreover in their concurring opinion in the 
same case, Judges Tulkens and Zagrebelsky issued the stark warning that the Court, in 
seeking to evaluate ‘not only the law and its consequences, but also the parliamentary 
debate’, was embarking on ‘difficult and slippery terrain’ given that this was ‘an area 
in which two sources of legitimacy meet, the Court on the one hand and the national 
parliament on the other’.135 
Aruna Sathanapally suggests that the advance of process-based review may 
have the ironic consequence of denuding parliaments of those very deliberative 
qualities that contribute to their legitimacy in the first place:  ‘… the more human 
rights scrutiny resembles legal analysis in anticipation of what a court would decide 
the less likely it is that the institution … will be drawing on any unique deliberative 
capabilities’. Furthermore, argues Sathanapally, where legislatures focus on judicial 
decision-making there exists the risk that human rights concerns will be reduced to 
predictions of ‘how a court may treat a particular matter, rather than the type of 
deliberation that human rights – as fundamental ethical commitments – ought to 
invite’.136 Again, a significant irony suggests itself. If process-based reviewed is 
viewed through the prism of dialogue or deliberative democracy, in which no actor 
has a monopoly of wisdom on how human rights balances should be struck, and the 
democratic fora in states constitute a valuable and unique component of the 
“conversation”, then a judicial procedural turn that leads to those legislatures 
attempting to ape future judicial decision makers may actually lead to the muting of 
that democratic voice. 
 
5. Symbolic Debates 
 
It is axiomatic that the greater the emphasis placed on domestic procedure, the greater 
the incentive will be for states to show that they are conducting the right kind of 
debate: one in which the human rights issues are properly considered and balanced 
against competing factors. It will thus clearly benefit the state – with one eye on 
future human rights challenges in Strasbourg – to ensure that a visible and apparently 
genuine debate is undertaken. Accordingly, there is a real risk that states will just 
conduct ‘symbolic debates’, or merely engage in ‘window dressing’ to disguise 
abusive measures, so as to protect such measures from challenge at any subsequent 
Strasbourg hearing.137   
 
C. Minority Rights 
                                                        
132 Saul (n 46) 1082. 
133 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009) 15. 
134 Hirst (n 38) dissent of Wildhaber et al, para 7. 
135 Hirst (n 38) Concurring opinion of Tulkens et al.  
136 Sathanapally (n 74) 60. See also A Sathanapally, Beyond Disagreement: Open Remedies in Human 
Rights Adjudication (OUP 2012) 49. 
137 Donald and Leach (n 129) 84; Sathanapally (n 74) 76; and Saul (n 1) 28. 
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The ironies and uncertainties alluded to above are undoubtedly problematic. 
Addressing them will take considerable time and care.  However, in our opinion, a far 
more significant risk associated with process-based review in the context of blanket 
bans lies in the implications for the rights of vulnerable and unpopular minorities. 
Human rights protections in liberal democracies are, at their core, designed to afford 
protection to those who may be at risk from the dominant interests of majorities.  
Frequently these are people with no real voice or sway in legislatures elected by those 
very same majorities.138     
As we have seen in the cases discussed above, blanket bans on kinds of 
conduct covered by Convention rights by definition catch all those whose conduct 
falls within their net, with no little or account taken of individual circumstances.  
Where process-based review supplants, in whole or in part, substantive review by the 
Court, and where in essence the Court says that it will place emphasis on the quality 
of the debates that took place during the enactment of the ban – rather than its actual 
impact in a particular case – then this absence of individuation is necessarily 
accentuated. As the Court has said: ‘… the more convincing the general justifications 
for the general measure are, the less importance the Court will attach to its impact in a 
particular case’.139   
In contrast, as far as vulnerable minority applicants are concerned, it matters 
not how good the parliamentary debate was that led to the measure that infringed their 
rights. As Judge Nussberger has said: ‘[w]hat matters for the “Humiliated and 
Insulted” … are the results. It is not sufficient that justice is seen to be done but that it 
is done. Therefore the finding of a procedural violation of a Convention right is often 
unsatisfactory for the applicant.’140 
The European Court has the role of ‘ensuring the observance’ by states of the 
substantive rights of the ECHR.141 After all, article 1 requires that states ‘secure’ the 
rights of all those within their jurisdiction, and not simply to take them into 
consideration in a particular manner. As Sathanapally points out, ‘[h]uman rights law 
is not agnostic as to outcomes: the ultimate issue before [the Court] is whether the 
particular State action or decision that is under challenge complies with the 
substantive right claimed’.142 Indeed, it is significant that one of the Court’s most 
vocal advocates of process-based review, Judge Spano, voiced a note of caution in his 
concurring opinion in the cases concerning the blanket ban on face-covering in 
Belgium, Dakir and Belcacemi: 
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… the Court’s increased emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity does not 
give a carte blanche to member States in their choice of measures and means 
that restrict Convention rights even though a balancing of interests has taken 
place at the legislative level. History has amply demonstrated that there is an 
inherent risk in democratic societies that majoritarian sentiments, subsequently 
translated into legislative enactments, are formed on the basis of ideas and 
values which threaten fundamental human rights. Insular and vulnerable 
groups are therefore left with recourse to courts and these courts, whether 
national or international, like this Court, have the duty to review and detect, if 
possible, whether the imposition of measures, although widely accepted in the 
legislative forum, are triggered by animus or intolerance towards a particular 
idea, view or religious faith.143   
 
So what of the rights of applicants who might be regarded as being ‘insular and 
vulnerable’? In SAS and the Belgian veil cases, the legislative debates that led to the 
bans on face covings in public space were held by the Court to indicate that the bans 
were a ‘choice of society’. But, critically, those debates failed to take into account the 
views of the very people with the most obvious interest in the subjects under 
discussion – women who wear the veil.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Judge Spano recently argued that the first four decades of the Court’s existence 
constituted a ‘substantive embedding phase’ for the ECHR, and that the recent shift 
towards process-based review represents a new historical era for the Court – the start 
of a ‘procedural embedding phase’.144 In this new phase, he argues, the Court’s 
purpose is ‘to incentivize national authorities to fulfill their obligations to secure 
Convention rights, thereby raising the overall level of human rights protections in 
European legal space’ and that the ‘Court has begun to realign its project attempting 
to trigger increased engagement with the Convention by national authorities’.145    
If Judge Spano is correct then it may well be that the procedural turn described 
in this article is not only inevitable, but is also to be welcomed as a part of this ‘new 
historical era’. Indeed, if the Promised Land envisaged by the likes of Judges Spano 
and Spielmann146 is achieved, whereby contracting states properly adopt human rights 
standards and procedures into their domestic processes, the European Court’s 
subsidiary role will become one of checking domestic procedures and correcting 
flagrant and egregious abuses.147  
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However, as we have argued, some serious questions remain about an 
untrammeled move to process-based review, especially in relation to the imposition of 
inflexible blanket bans. Given that this is a field in which there is an abundance of 
uncertainty, it would seem incumbent for members of the Court to tread warily. This 
is self-evidently the case when it comes to the very kinds of people who are most in 
need of the ECtHR’s protection – vulnerable or unpopular minorities, who are 
subjected to restrictions on their rights by sweeping legislative enactments of the 
majority will. Thus, the Court needs to be careful to avoid laying itself open to the 
accusation that it is failing in its crucial mission of protecting the human rights of the 
weak and vulnerable – and thereby ensure that the ‘procedural turn’ does not in effect 
constitute a turn for the worse rather than the better. 
 
